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Collecting  social  security  contributions  is  an  important  operational  issue  in  all
types  of  pension  system.  Many  regimes  are  plagued  by  poor  compliance  and
weak,  inefficient  administration.  Some  countries  have  tried  to  introduce  an
automatic  incentive  to  contribute  by moving  systems  closer  to  'actuarial  fairness',
where  pension  benefits  are  more  strictly  related  to  individual  contributions.
Examples  include  the  systems  of individual  accounts  introduced  in  a  range  of
countries  in  Latin  America  and  Eastern  Europe.  But in  these  regimes,  collecting
and  transferring  contributions  is a more complex  process.
This  paper  considers  different  aspects  of  the  process  of collecting  pension
contributions.  In  the  following  Secfion, we  describe  the  most  serious  problems
affecting  collection  systems  in  several countries.  Section 2 presents  the conceptual
relationships  between  alternative  pension-system  models  and  collection  systems.
Section  3  deals  with  the  differences  between  centralised  and  decentralised
collection  systems  and  their  advantages  and  disadvantages.  Section  4  looks  at
operational  issues.  Section  5 compares  experience  of collection  systems  in a range
of  different  countries.  Section  6 looks  at problems  of regulation  and  supervision,
while  the final section concludes.
1  Analysis and research unit,  Nacion AFJP and  benefits  and  insurance  manager, pension
fund  supervision agency respectively.  This paper forms part of the World Bank Pension Reform
Primer,  a  comprehensive  toolkit  for  policy makers  on  designing  and  implementing  pension
reforms.
11.  The problems of pension contribution collection systems
A central aim of pension reforms has often been to  improve  poor rates  of
collection of contributions.  Studying these reform efforts is therefore  a useful way
of identifying  the  most  frequent  problems  with  collection,  such  as  compliance
incentives and weaknesses in administrative institutions  and procedures.
1.1  Compliance incentives
Even the best systems of collection and control will fail if they do not have
the support  of participants, both employers and employees.  Incentives to comply
are  seriously lacking in  many pension  systems.  This can  be either because  the
financial  and  administrative  burden  of  compliance  is  heavy  or  because
contributions are high relative to benefits (for example, where  governments have
difficulty in meeting their obligations).
High  contribution  rates  are  a  common  problem.  Total  contributions,
including levies on both employer and employee, often exceed 25 per cent of gross
earnings.  Adding  health  insurance  and  other  contributory  schemes  (such  as
unemployment), they can reach 50 per cent.
These  high  rates  are  not  only  a  concern  because  of  their  effects  on
compliance.  They may  also reduce incentives  for employers  to hire labour  and
individuals'  incentives to  work.  They will  also increase  the  incentive to  evade
contributions by working in the informal sector.
In  many  countries,  the  structure  of  contributions  is  also  regressive.  In
France, for example, the employer contribution  rate is 46 per cent, payable from
the  first Franc of  earnings.  But once  earnings  are just  30  per  cent  above  the
2average,  no  further  contribution  is levied.2 Disincentives  are therefore  particularly
strong  for low-paid  workers  and their  (potential)  employers.
However,  cutting  overall  contribution  rates  is  very  expensive.  It  also
conflicts with  the  demands  on the system,  not  least from  an  ageing  population  and
earlier  retirement.  In  countries  that  have  reduced  contribution  rates,  there  has
been  little  evidence  of  increases  in  compliance.  In  Argentina,  for  example,  a
progressive  reduction  in  employers'  contributions  of 15 per  cent  of gross  wages
since 1995 has  not  increased  collection  rates.
The lack  of  incentives  to  contribute  should  be  addressed  by  any  pension
reform.  One  strategy  is  to  introduce  a  closer  link  between  contributions  and
benefits,  both  in  the  financing  of  benefits  and  the  level  of  pension  for  the
individual.  A  part  of  this  reform  might  be  to  shift  the  financing  of  minimum
pensions  or social assistance  for the  elderly  to the general  budget.
1.2  Administrative  incentives
A second  incentive  issue  is  encouraging  collection  agencies  to  administer
the  system  effectively.  The  agencies  can  be  given  targets  or  rewarded  with  a
percentage  of the fines  they impose.  But targets  can often lead  to limited  and rigid
objectives,  such  as making  no further  effort  to increase  compliance  once (relatively
low)  targets  are  achieved.  Distribution  of  fines  can  also  distort  incentives,
encouraging  punitive  rather  than  preventive  strategies.  Extreme  caution  is  also
required  to avoid  corruption.
1.3  Weakness of the collecting system
A number  of weaknesses  are common  to collecting  systems.
2  Eight other OECD  countries  - Austria, Canada,  Germany,  Greece, Ireland,  Luxembourg,
Spain and the United States - have such limits. See OECD  (1997),  Table 24. Chapter  5 of the
OECD  report provides a comprehensive  discussion  of the effect  of social security  contributions  on
labour  markets.
3. First,  a  poor  system  for  identifying  employers  and  employees.  Many
countries  do  not  have  a  unique  identification  system  for  social  security.
National  identification  numbers,  internal  numbers  generated  by  regional
offices, tax identification  numbers  and  others  often  confuse  administration  and
prevent  the  development  of  efficient,  streamnlined  procedures.  They  can  also
allow  some  employers  and  employees  to slip through  the collection net.
*  Secondly,  poor use of technology.  Employer  reports  filed  and  stored  on paper
forms  are still commnon. Even when  collection  agencies  require  electronic  filing
from  medium  and  large  employers,  often  no proper  database  is built.  Such  a
database  could be used to certify  compliance  or accrual  of benefit  rights.  Often,
workers  about  to retire  are required  to take proof  of past  contributions  to social
security  agencies.  This  causes  particular  problems  in  countries  with  a mobile
workforce.
•  Thirdly,  frequency  of  reports.  Even  when  employer  reports  are  properly
processed  and  stored,  it is common  to find  that  they  are only required  annually
or every  six months.  Data for monthly  payments  are  often poor.
. Finally,  multiple  collecting  agencies.  Taxation,  social  security  and  health-
insurance  administration  are  often  separated.  Employers  are required  to  file
multiple  declarations.  They  contain  much  the same  information,  and  may  also
duplicate  other  statutory  reports,  such  as  returns  to  statistical  offices.  This  is
considerable  burden,  discouraging  compliance.  Furthermore,  it is also  usually
impossible  to  cross-check  the  different  reports,  because  of  differences  in
formats  etc.
1.4  Weakness in control processes
The  most  common  weaknesses  of  control  systems  are  inadequate  or
unsound  information;  lack  of data-processing  capacity,  such  as poor  information
technology;  unreliable  systems  for generating  'alarms';  and  exposure  to corruption.
4These  problems need  to  be  addressed  together,  but  usually  they  evolve
independently.  For  example,  data  are  seldom  checked  for  consistency  or
incorporated in electronic databases.  Errors or mis-reporting are usually  identified
by  administrators'  intuition  rather  than  predefined  rules.  A  simple  set  of
indicators  can  be  compared  across  companies  and  across  time  for  a  single
company.  These might include  the ratio  of contribution  payments  to  the  total
payroll or to the number of employees, or the ratio of contributions to income tax
deductions.  Such indicators  can  often  spot  many  deliberate  and  unintentional
errors.  Of course, an important  prerequisite  for such  checks is effective use  of
information technology.
2.  Collecting contributions  in different pension models
The two most important  characteristics of different pension systems are the
structure  of pension benefits and  the way  they  are financed.  In  defined-benefit
schemes, the level of the pension  is independent  of the amount contributed.  It is
usually  either  a flat-rate payment  or related  to  some measure  of  earnings. 3 In
defined-contribution  plans,  the  pension  depends  on  the  level  of  individual
contributions and the returns they earm. Actual systems tend to combine elements
of both of these textbook  models.4
The  second  criterion  distinguishes  pay-as-you-go  plans  (where  current
contributions  pay for current  benefits) from funded  schemes (where pensions are
paid from a fund built up from past contributions).  Again, many schemes combine
elements of both.  For example, a modest fund  might be used to meet  short-term
obligations or to prepare for adverse future  demographic  developments.  In some
funded  systems,  assets are  primarily  held  in  government  securities.  This  is
3  In  14 countries  with public  sector,  defined-benefit  plans,  the  pension  is related  to average
earnings,  in 49, to 'final'  earnings  (for example,  the  last five years)  and  in 17, to 'best'  earnings  (for
example,  the highest  ten years).  See Disney  and Whitehouse  (1999), Tables 1 and  2.
4  See Bodie,  Marcus and Merton  (1988) and  Disney  and  Whitehouse  (1996) for a discussion  of
the two types  of plan.
5backdoor pay-as-you-go financing, since it allows the public sector to run a larger
deficit than otherwise possible.
While there are  common themes, the  problems  and solutions  in collection
systems are different in each model.
2.1  Defined-benefit, pay-as-you-go  schemes
Pay-as-you-go schemes, with some kind  of defined-benefit formula, are the
most  common  pension  system  around  the  world.  Contributions  are  usually
collected  from employers  and  employees  and  sometimes from  the  government
itself.  Typically, some minimum  period of contribution  is required  to qualify for
pension benefits and the pension level is related  to individual  earnings.  However,
formulae  are  often  highly  non-linear,  with  progressive  accrual  schedules,
minimum and maximum pensions, adjustments  depending on the age at which the
pension  is  drawn  etc. 5 These  systems  impose  substantial  information
requirements, including individuals'  earnings'  and contributions'  history.  In many
countries, this information is only gathered  at the time of retirement.  During the
working  life, contributions  are  collected periodically  from employers  (including
employees'  contributions withheld from earrings).  A periodic report  on individual
workers is also usually required, but often the informnation  accumulates unused.
These collection systems tend to be administratively  cheap,  but evasion can
be widespread  with  little  means of reducing  it.  They can  also  impose  serious
burdens  on  retirees  claiming  benefits.  Finally,  the  lack  of  readily  accessible
administrative  records puts  the onus of proof of past contributions  and  earnings
onto the individual.
5  See Disney and  Whitehouse  (1999), Tables  1, 2 and  3, and  Figure  13.
62.2  Defined-contribution, pay-as-you-go  schemes
These  schemes,  called  'notional  accounts'  or  'notional  defined-contribution
plans',  are not common.  (Examples  are Latvia,  Poland  and  Sweden. 6)  They mimic
a  defined-contribution  scheme  by  defining  benefits  as  the  accumulation  of
contributions  and  notional,  legislatively  defined  'interest'.  Annuity  rates,  too,  are
set  administratively.  So,  although  they  are  superficially  similar  to  a  defined-
contribution  scheme, they are just  a form of pay-as-you-go,  defined-benefit  plan.7
Unlike  the  defined-benefit  model,  detailed  information  on  each  individual
contribution  must  be collected  and  maintained.  In theory,  this  could  work  like
many  defined-benefit  schemes,  with  information  on  each worker's  contributions'
history  gathered  at the  time  of  retirement.  However,  such  a  scheme  would  be
fragile: differences  between  actual  contributions  and  those  declared  by  the worker
at retirement  could cause problems  with  such  a system.
The  few  proposed  or  operational  notional-accounts  schemes  are  run  by  a
single  administrative  institution.  Collection  and  individual  record-keeping  are
therefore  centralised.  The system  is more  complex  than  a defined-benefit  plan  to
operate.  Individual  accounts  must  be  maintained,  with  regular  credits  of
contributions  and implicit  interest.
2.3  Defined-benefit,  funded  schemes
Defined-benefit,  funded  pensions  are  usually  employer-sponsored,
voluntary  plans.  They are a common  feature  of many  developed  countries,  such as
Ireland,  Japan,  the Netherlands,  the United  Kingdom  and  the United  States.
The collection  system  is relatively  simple  because  employers  run  the plans
and  there  is no  reason  to  set  up  a  centralised  scheme.  Employers  need  to  hold
individual  members'  contributions'  and  earnings'  records.
6  On which,  see Fox (1999), Gora  and Rutkowski  (1998) and  Sunden  (1999) respectively.
7First, actuarial  projections  of workers'  accrued  benefits  and  so, the scheme's
finances  are usually  required.  Any  shortfalls  must  then be made  good,  and  many
countries  also require  surpluses  to be distributed. 8
Secondly,  schemes  need  individual  records  for  employees  who  leave.
Originally,  many  plans  simply  returned  the  employee's  contributions  (with  or
without  interest).  More  commonly  now,  employees  are  able  to  transfer  their
accumulated  rights  (generated  from both  employer  and employee  contributions)  to
their  new employer's  plan.9
2.4  Defined-contribution, funded schemes
Defined-contribution,  funded  schemes  have  become  increasingly  common.
Nine  countries  in  Latin  America  and  five  in  Europe  have  now  implemented  or
legislated  reforms  introducing  individual  pension  accounts. 10 , 11 All  of  these
schemes  maintain  some  element  of  defined-benefit,  pay-as-you-go  provision. 12
This 'first  pillar'  can be means-tested  or a mniimum  pension  guarantee,  flat-rate  or
earnings-related.
The 'second  pillar',  the  defined-contribution  funded  scheme,  operates  as a
long-term  savings  plan.  Contributions  are  received  by  the  pension  funds
periodically,  and  credited  to  individuals'  accounts.  The  funds  are  invested  in
financial  assets,  and  the  returns  on these  assets  added  to the  individual  accounts.
7  See Disney and Shwarz (1999)  and World Bank (1999)  for a detailed discussion.
8  See Laboul (1998)  for a detailed discussion.
9  In  the  United  Kingdom,  for  example,  employers  were  able  to  return  employees
contributions if they left before retirement age until 1975. Until 1985,  benefits had to be 'preserved'
in the scheme, but they were not adjusted for inflation or earnings growth.  Since 1985, they must
be limited price indexed to a ceiling of 5 per cent. See Dilnot et al. (1994),  p. 193-194.
10  See Queisser (1999) on Latin America, Palacios and  Rocha (1998) on  Hungary, Gora and
Rutkowski (1998)  on Poland, Sunden (1999)  on Sweden, Whitehouse (1998) on the United Kingdom.
11  Other  countries  with  significant  defined-contribution  provision  include  Australia,
Denmark, Iceland and the United States.
12  The vast majority of these defined-contribution schemes are also voluntary  for a significant
part of the workforce. The old public, defined-benefit, pay-as-you-go scheme will therefore operate
alongside the new plan for many years to come.  See Palacios and Whitehouse  (1998).
8At the time  of retirement,  the accumulated  balance  can be converted  to an  annuity
or  periodic  withdrawals  made.  Although  it would  be  possible  to create  a system
with  a  single  fund,  most  countries  have  chosen  competing,  privately  managed
funds.  Workers  are also able to switch  from  one manager  to another.
The  informational  requirements  for  funded  plans  are  similar  to  those
described  for  pay-as-you-go,  notional  accounts.  However,  information  gathering
probably  needs  to be  more  frequent  in  the funded  system,  because  of fluctuations
in the value of the underlying  assets.
3.  Centralised  versus decentralised  collection
Under  a  centralised  system,  a  public  agency  is  responsible  for  collecting
contributions  and  distributing  them  to  different  agencies  or  funds.  To  do  this
accurately,  the  agency  needs  to  identify  each  individual  worker  and  the  amount
contributed.  In  a  decentralised  system,  collection  is  the  responsibility  of  each
agency  or pension  fund,  eliminating  the intermediate  'clearing  house'.  In practice,
there  is a spectrum  of options  between  these  polar extremes.
The  case  for  a  centralised  scheme  in  a  pay-as-you-go  pension  system  is
clear.  The  single,  central  pension  agency  can  obviously  be  responsible  for
collection  as  well.  Nevertheless,  it  is  important  to  consider  any  other  welfare
programmes,  such  as  health  insurance,  family  allowances,  unemployment
insurance  etc. at the  same  time.  If these  programmes  are also  centrally  managed,
but  by a separate  institution  from  the  pension  system,  and  also  financed  through
payroll  taxes,  then  either  a  centralised  or  decentralised  option  might  be
appropriate.  A  single  agency  could  collect  contributions  and  then  distribute  the
revenue  among  the  different  agencies,  or  the  contributions  for  each  programme
could  be collected  by each  responsible  institution.  The choice  should  be based  on
efficiency, security  and  cost.  We discuss  ten  different  important  factors.
93.1  Economies of scale
If  more  than  one  pension  fund  or  welfare  agency  is entitled  to  revenues
from  payroll  taxes,  then  economies  of  scale  become  important.  Decentralised
collection  duplicates  administrative  structures.  But if an  efficient  banking  system
can be used  for  collection,  then  there  is no  reason  why  costs  will be  substantially
higher  than  a centralised  system.
A second  potential  source  of economies  of scale  is combining  the  collection
of contributions  and  taxes.  The bases  for personal  income  taxes and  social  security
contributions  are  often  similar.13 Combining  the  two  processes  can  reduce
duplication.
3.2  Efficiency of existing collection agencies
Inefficient  collection  and  admninistrative  procedures  of existing  agencies  are
often used  to justify  the creation  of a new  agency.  New  pension  systems  based  on
privately  managed  individual  accounts  require  a  rapid,  safe  collection  and
distribution  system,  both  of  money  and  data.  Some  countries  have  chosen  to
disband  the  old  collection  agency  and  authorise  pension  fund  managers  to  collect
contributions  themselves.
3.3  Timing and speed of transfers
Timing  of collection  and  speed  of transfers  is critical  to  systems  based  on
individual  accounts  because  of the  loss of interest  from  the fund  and  the  potential
erosion  of  value  through  inflation  if  contributions  are  delayed.  Transfers  are
therefore  best  made  monthly  (or whatever  period  is used  for  calculating  salaries)
13  Although  there  are  often  differences:  in  income  sources  covered  (eg.  fringe  benefits,
investment  or  self-employment  income),  in  the  unit  of  assessment  (income  tax  often  on  a  family
basis, social  security  contributions  usually  on  individuals)  and  in the  period  of assessment  (annual
for income  tax, sometimes  monthly  for social security  contributions).
10and  should  not  take more  than  a few days from  payment  until  they are credited  to
individual  accounts.
A system  of compensation  should  be developed  for  any  delays,  to be  paid
by employers,  banks,  collection  agencies  and  pension  fund  managers  if they  are
responsible.  Preferably,  compensation  should  be  automatic,  based  on  prevailing
interest  rates.  Contributors  should  be informed  of any  compensation  paid.
A  decentralised  model  is likely  to be  faster  than  a centralised  one  because
contributions  are collected  directly  by  agencies  or  pension  fund  managers,  cutting
out the 'middle  man'  or clearing  house  in between.
3.4  Control  mechanisms
Although  a decentralised  system  will probably  transfer  contributions  more
quickly,  it has  important  regulatory  and  supervisory  implications.  Transferring
contributions  directly  from  employers  to funds  without  the intervention  of a public
agency  requires  careful  supervision.  In particular,  regular  reporting  and  auditing
of contribution  records  are necessary.
3.5  Cross  controls
Centralising  collection  allows  for  cross-checks  of  pensions  with  other
information,  such  as  health  insurance  and  personal  income  taxation.  A  single
agency, responsible  for all collection,  can develop  a single  reporting  system.  Even
if  there  are  separate  agencies,  sharing  information  can  improve  compliance.
However,  there  are a number  of potential  pitfalls  with  such co-operation.
First,  there  may  be  technical  difficulties  due  to  incompatible  information
technology  systems.  Secondly,  sharing  information  may  be illegal  under  privacy
laws.  Thirdly,  there  is at least  the  potential  that  overall  compliance  may  decline.
Compliance  with  pension  and  health-insurance  programmes  is often  higher  than
with  the personal  income  tax.  If collection  is unified  and  people  are  aware  of the
11cross-check,  then  personal  income  tax  revenues  might  increase,  but  revenues  for
welfare  programmes  might  decline.  This  suggests  the  need  for  caution  before
increasing  co-operation  between  different  agencies.
3.6  Incentives
At  first  sight,  decentralised  models  appear  to  set efficient  incentives,  since
the  organisation  responsible  for  collection  receives  the  revenue.  In  contrast,  a
public  agency  operates  under  a  pre-established  budget,  with  little  incentives  to
increase  revenues.  Of course,  it is possible  to  design  incentives  for  the  agency  to
act  more  efficiently  (see  the  discussion  in  Section  1.2  above)  but  this  cannot
replicate  the inducements  of a decentralised  system.
3.7  Enforcement  power
Any  actor  in  the  pension  system  can  report  evasion:  workers,  employers,
public  officials, and  pension  fund  managers.  But enforcement  powers  can only  be
assigned  to  a  single  agency.  In  some  cases,  this  is  the  collection  agency,
particularly  where  collection  is centralised  in a public  agency.
In countries  with  decentralised  collection  systems,  there  are wider  options.
Giving  enforcement  powers  to  a  private  agency  involves  authorising  it  to  audit
and  penalise  employers  and  employees.  This  is  legally  difficult  and  often
impossible.  One  solution  is  to  require  management  companies  to  identify  non-
compliance  and then  supply  the information  to the government.
3.8  Cost  of the collecting  scheme
A  centralised  scheme  is  in  principle  cheaper  than  a  decentralised  one
because  of economnies of scale, especially  if it is possible  to centralise  the collection
of  pension  contributions  with  other  social  security  contributions  and  taxes.  A
centralised  system  of collection  also simplifies  the  payment  processes.  However,
12competition  in a decentralised  model,  with  each collector  trying  to minimise  costs,
may compensate  for the diseconomies  of scale.
Social security  institutions  carry  out  a  diverse  range  of activities.  There  is
no  particular  reason  why  an  agency  that  is  effective  at  distributing  and
administering  benefits  should  also  be  effective  at  collecting  revenues.  This
argument  works  both  ways:  there  is evidence  that  tax authorities,  for example,  are
ineffective  at distributing  benefits.14 Economies  of specialisation  point  to separate
agencies  for benefit  administration  and  contribution  collection.
3.9  Financing  collection
There  is  some  fairness  in  the  costs  of  collection  being  borne  by  the
participants  who  benefit  from  the  system.  This  occurs  automatically  in
decentralised  systems,  with  each  managing  company  covering  its  own  collection
costs  out  of the  contribution  revenues.  However,  this  need  not  be  the  case  in
centralised  system.  One  solution  is to  deduct  a  fee  from  contribution  revenues
before  they  are  distributed  or  to  charge  the  managing  companies.  However,
pricing  is difficult when  the agency  also collects other  contributions  (for first-pillar
pensions,  health,  etc.) or taxes, which  might  result  in hidden  cross-subsidies.
3.10  Corruption
Centralised  collection  can reduce  the  risk of corruption  since the  central  set
of information  is shared  by a number  of actors  in the pension  system.  The risk  of
corruption  can be  reduced  further  when  'centralised  collection'  is simply  a  set  of
information  signals  between  financial  institutions  and  the  recipients  of revenues.
The role  of the collecting  agency  is then  merely  as guarantor  of the process.  This
14  Various  studies  of the  earned  income  tax  credit  in the  United  States,  for example,  show  a
high degree  of overpayment,  which  has  been blamed  on the fact that the Internal  Revenue  Service is
not  used  to paying  money  out.  See General  Accounting  Office (1994) and  Whitehouse  (1996,1997b).
13also avoids the spurious  use of funds by the state, which was an important political
issue in Argentina and Venezuela, for example.
3.11  Summary:  centralised  versus decentralised collection
Table 1 recapitulates the arguments  presented  in this Section.
Table 1. Comparison of alternative  collection systems
Criterion  Centralised  Decentralised
Economies  of scale  High  Duplication  of costs
Efficiency  Traditional  agencies  often  inefficient  New organisations  with  up-to-date
technology  can be  more  efficient
Timing  Lags  possible  Practically  instantaneous
Control  mechanisms Simple  Complex
Cross  controls  Taxation,  other  contributions  None
Incentives  Fiscal  Profitability
Enforcement  power  Absolute  Indirect  or non-existent
Costs  Economies  of  scale but monopoly  Competition  but  diseconomies  of
scale
Financing  State  or pension  funds (but pricing  Pension  funds
problems)
Transparency  Sharing  information  reduces  Potential  for inappropriate  use of
corruption  risk  privileged  information
4.  Operational issues in a centralising collection
Countries with multipillar pension systems and  decentralised collection can
have  up  to  five different  institutions  responsible  for  levying  contributions  and
taxes.  These are the social security administration  (first pillar pensions and  other
programmes), the health fund administration,  private  pension funds, and  the  tax
and  customs  authorities  (income taxes,  value-added  tax,  customs  and  excise
duties).
4.1  Alternative  strategies for centralisation
Collection  may  be  centralised  in  different  ways,  depending  on  the
contributions to be centralised, on the  agency to be responsible  for collection, and
on the existence of collecting intermediaries.
14Contributions  to be centralised
If centralisation is limited to pension contributions,  implementation  will be much
simpler.  But this loses potential advantages,  such as economies of scale and  the
ability to cross-checks with  other levies.  If it were planned  to include taxation  in
the  unified collection system, it would  make most sense  to  assign contribution
collection to the tax agency, or to create a new, unified agency.
Agency responsiblefor  collecting
A starting point  in  making  the choice between  the tax  authority  and  the social
security  administration  as  the  responsible  agency  is  to  assess  their  relative
efficiency through  aggregate  statistical  information.  This  might  include  the
absolute level and  trend  in  revenues  collected, the  level  and  trend  in  rates  of
evasion,  and  administrative  costs.  Secondly,  their  collection  and  control
procedures  can  be  assessed,  including  comparisons  of  the  role  of  banking
intermediaries,  the  degree  of  automation  in  administrative  procedures,  the
methods  for identifying  contributors  or  taxpayers.  Often,  the  tax  authority  is
believed to be more efficient,  but this may not stand up to such detailed analysis.
The creation of a new agency through  merger  might  be a more palatable
alternative  than choosing between the  two.  This is easiest  to  achieve when  the
social  security  administration  clearly  differentiates  between  collection  of
contributions  and  disbursement  of  benefits.  The  greatest  advantage  will  be
obtained if tax and customs are also rolled into this new institution.  The division
of responsibilities in the centralised and  decentralised models is shown in Table 2.
The radical reforms needed  to implement  the centralised model  imply enormous
functional, organisational and cultural changes.  This suggests that gradual change
might be the best approach.
15Table 2. Division of responsibilities  between  different  agencies
in centralised  and decentralised  models
Decentralised  Centralised
Social securty administration  Social security administration
Administering  first-pillar pensions and other  Administering first-pillar pensions and other
social security benefits  social security benefits
Collecting contributions for public pensions and
other benefits
Health fund administration  Health fund administration
Operating health services  Operating health services
Collecting health contributions
Pension funds managers  Pension funds managers
Administering second-pillar pensions  Administering second-pillar pensions
Collecting second-pillar pension contributions
Tax authority  Unified collection authority
Collecting personal and corporate income taxes,  Collecting social security contributions (including
VAT and other taxes and excises  first- and second-pillar pensions, health and
other benefits), income taxes, VAT and other
taxes and excises, and customs duties
Distributing revenues and information to social
security administration, health fund




4.2  A gradual  strategy for  centralised  collection
The administrative  upheaval  of centralisation  and  its financial  and  political
cost  point  to  the  benefits  of  gradualism.  This  could  begin  with  centralising
processes,  such  as identifying  employers  and  employees,  unifying  social  security
and  tax  forms  and  co-ordinating  control  and  collection  procedures  with
centralisation  of  administrative  structures  occurring  last.  This  only  works  if
operational  centralisation  does  not  need  unified  decision-making  at the  top.  In
practice,  many  of the benefits of centralisation  come from  unifying  procedures,  not
from  unifying  institutions.
16Identification  of employers
Employers  are  usually  required  to  register  and  obtain  several  identification
numbers  when they open for business.  These numbers  (including those provided
by  statistical  offices, local and  national  tax  authorities,  pension  systems,  health
systems and others) are often incompatible and updating  of records is not always
efficient.  A unique standard  for identification numbers  for all these purposes  is a
first, necessary step.
Identification  of employees
A  single  system  for identifying  workers  is  also  necessary.  This requires  the
unification of existing systems,  probably involving a number  of agencies, and  a
mechanism for issuing numbers  to new-borns or labour-market  entrants.  Efforts
should  be  co-ordinated  with  tax  authorities  if  they  already  have  (or  plan  to
develop) a taxpayer identification system, as requirements will overlap.
In the  short-run, identification  of contributors  is useful even if no  radical
reforms to the system's architecture are planned and a pay-as-you-go scheme is left
unchanged.  This will allow  better  verification of  contribution  conditions  and
earnings records for defined-benefit plans.  Employers can be required to provide
periodic lists of the identification numbers of their employees and their earnings.
Identification systems are a vital prerequisite for improving adrinistrative
processes,  introducing  or  updating  information  technology  and  developing
databases of contributions and earnings records.
Unification  of paymentformsfor different  social  security  contributions
In some countries,  payments  of different social contributions  can be made  under
different  procedures.  In  Argentina,  the pension  system  administrators  used  to
collect  payment  information  in  paper  form,  which  was  different  from  the
17information  provided  to  administrators  of  the  health  system  and  other  social
security  components.
Procedures  for  actual  payment  of  contributions  vary  between  countries.
Usually,  this  is either  at the  social security  agency's  offices, through  the  banking
system  or  through  a  centralised  payment  system.  Whichever  is  adopted,
developing  a  standard  for  payments  and  information  transfers  is  critical  for
successful  centralisation.
Unification of paymentformsfor  income taxes and social security contributions
A  completely  different  approach  underlies  the  design  and  management  of social
security  contributions  and  personal  income  taxes.  They  are rarely  consistent  and
cross-checks  are often impossible.  Unifying  the  payment  formns  used  by the  social
security  admninistration  and  the  tax  authority  should  significantly  enhance
efficiency.  Employers  should  include  all payments  in a unified  form,  and  banks  or
collecting  agencies  could  then  transfer  the  funds  to  the  corresponding  agency.
This  requires  the design  of a conmnon payment  form  and  the design  of routines  of
centralised  collection.
Design of alternative procedures of control
Together  with  the  unification  of  payments,  control  procedures  should  be
redesigned  and  improved  to  include  automatic  cross-controls  and  risk  analysis.
Not  all control  processes  need  to be immediately  centralised.  Inspectors  from  the
social  security  administration  and  the tax authority  should  be retrained  to manage
the new  control  tools.
Design a centralised structurefor  contribution and taxes collection
Once  all payments  are centralised  and  new  control  routines  are set in place,  a new
collecting  structure  can  be  created,  by  merging  the  collection  areas  of  existing
18agencies.  This requires  a new  functional  structure,  the transfer  of the labour  force
and  of files and  documents.
5.  Selected  international  experiences
We  investigate  collecting  systems  in  eight  different  countries.  First,  we
compare  Chile and  Argentina,  which  are  good  examples  of a  decentralised  and  a
centralised  system  respectively.  Secondly,  we  examine  the  systems  of  four
European  countries:  Hungary,  Poland,  Sweden  and  the United  Kingdom.  We then
look  at the  case  for  centralisation  in  Georgia,  the  lessons  of the  failed  reform  in
Venezuela  on  the  importance  of  collection  procedures  and  the  administrative
aspects  of reform  proposals  in the United  States.
5.1  Decentralised collection: the example of Chile
Chile  pioneered  a  funded,  defined-contribution  pension  system  as  a
substitute  for  a  pay-as-you-go  defined-benefit  scheme  in  1980-81.  Chile's  'first-
pillar'  pensions  are limited  to recognition  bonds  for  accrued  pension  rights  and  a
minimum  benefit  guarantee.  In both  cases,  the payment  is a one-off  transfer  from
the  general  government  budget  to  individual  accounts.  This  limited  first  pillar
offered  the  ideal  institutional  setting  for  fully  decentralised  collection  of pension
contributions.  Fund  management  companies,  known  as  AFPs  (administrados de
fondos  de  pensiones),  are  responsible  for  collecting  contributions  from  their
members.  Employers  are  required  to  identify  each  worker's  choice  of  pension
fund  and  make  appropriate  transfers  monthly.  This  complex  task  is simplified  by
intensive  use  of  information  technology.  Enforcement  powers  remain  with  the
government,  although  the  pension  funds  may  sue  employers  for  unpaid
contributions.
195.2  Centralised collection: the example of Argentina
Argentina's  reformed  system,  introduced  in  1993-94,  includes  a  more
substantial  pay-as-you-go,  defined-benefit  first  pillar  than  Chile's.  Argentina
opted  for  a fully  centralised  collection  system,  which,  by  1998,  covers  pensions,
health,  other welfare  benefits  and  taxes.  Collection  is assigned  to the tax authority,
known  as the federal  public  revenue  administration,  or AFIP.  Initially,  the agency
contracted  a private  company  to  operate  the  system.  But,  as of  August  1998, the
AFIP itself took over.  Employers  must  make  monthly  payments  and  reports  to the
agency,  indicating  individual  contributions  for  each  programme.  This  process  is
expedited  with  specially  designed,  freely  distributed  software.  Both payments  and
reports  can be filed in almost  any financial  institution,  at no cost  to the  contributor.
The  AFIP must  transfer  contributions  and  information  to  pension  fund  managers
within  48  hours  of  receipt.  Unlike  Chile,  pension  fund  managers  have  no
enforcement  responsibility,  which  lies solely with  the AFIP.
5.3  The Chilean and Argentine systems  compared
There is no clear  evidence  regarding  whether  Chile's  decentralised  model  or
Argentina's  centralised  system  is  more  efficient.  Compliance  seems  to  be
somewhat  higher  in  Chile.  But  this  may  reflect  a  stronger  tradition  of  tax
compliance  in Chile  and  the narrower  net  of compulsory  coverage.  For example,
the  self-employed  contribute  only  voluntarily  in  Chile,  while  in  Argentina,  this
group  with  high rates  of non-compliance  is compelled  to contribute.
Again,  comparisons  of costs  give  no  clear  answers.  Chile's  AFPs generally
use  commercial  banks  from  the same economic  group  to collect  contributions.  This
disguises  costs as there  is no observable  market  price,  although  one  AFP which  is
not  linked  to a bank  pays  less than  0.1 per  cent  of total  contributions  for collection
services.  The system  in  Argentina  appears  to be more  expensive.  The figures  are
not  public,  but  it has  been  estimated  that  the  AFIP  paid  approximately  $100m  a
year  to  the  private  company  running  the  system.  The  total  revenues  raised,
20including  all taxes and  contributions,  amounted  to  around  $20bn, giving  a cost of
0.5 per  cent of revenues.  Higher  costs in Argentina  can partly  be explained  by the
single  contribution,  whereas  in  Chile,  employers  make  a  number  of  different
payments  and  reports.  Secondly,  the  Argentine  tax authority  carries  out  a wider
range  of services,  such  as enrolment  in the  system  and  enforcement.  However,  a
cost  that  appears  as much  as five times  higher  than  Chile  is hard  to justify.  There
has been  controversy  over  the possibility  of overpayment  for the service.
21The  Figure  shows  the  flow  of  funds  in  Chile  and  Argentina.
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5.4  Collecting  contributions  in four  European  systems
The choice of collection system  in four  European  countries  - Hungary,
Poland,  Sweden and  the  United  Kingdom'5  - confirms  the importance  both  of
15 On Hungary, see  Palacios  and Rocha  (1998),  on Poland, Gora and Rutkowski  (1998),  on Sweden,
Sunden  (1999)  and on the United Kingdom, Whitehouse (1998).
22existing  institutional  arrangements  and  the  political  context  that  were  found  in
Argentina  and  Chile.
All  these  countries  have  maintained  a  significant  first  pillar.  In Hungary,
this  is  a  traditional  pay-as-you-go,  earnings-related  scheme.  Poland  envisages  a
first  pillar  based  on  notional  accounts.  When  the  new  system  matures,  it  is
planned  that  this  first  pillar  and  the  funded,  defined-contribution  pillar  will
provide  about  half  of  the  total  pension  each.  Sweden's  scheme  is  based  almost
wholly  on  notional  accounts,  with  only  a tiny  funded  component.  The first  pillar
in  the  United  Kingdom,  the  basic  state  pension,  is a  flat-rate  benefit,  currently
worth  around  15 per cent  of average  earnings.
Sweden
The  national  social  insurance  board  was  historically  responsible  for  collecting
contributions.  In 1975 a gradual  transfer  of this  tax  to the  national  tax board  was
begun,  which  was completed  in  1985.  The aim  was to  facilitate  cross-checking  of
data  and  limit  under-reporting.  The  enforcement  systems  for  taxation  and
contributions  are  now  fully  integrated.  A  combination  of  efficient  collection
procedures  and  a  strong  compliance  culture  results  in  very  low  evasion  of both
taxes and  contributions.
Hungary
At  the  other  extreme,  the  tax  authority  cannot  collect  Hungary's  social  security
contributions  and there  is a powerful  restriction  on cross-checking  between  tax and
contribution  data.  This  prohibition,  enforced  by  the  constitutional  court,  is
designed  to  protect  citizens'  privacy.  As  a  result,  compliance  is  arduous.
Employers  pay  contributions  directly  to pension  funds  and  report  to  them.  But
they also have  to provide  information  to a central  registry,  run by the pension  fund
supervisory  agency.
23Poland
Collection of social security contributions  (including health) will be admninistered
by the national  social security  institution, known  as ZUS.  This agency will then
transfer  funds  and  data to pension  funds.  Some administrative  problems  might
result  because  employers  will  still file reports  on  paper  at ZUS offices.  The
collection of  social security  contributions  will remain  totally separate  from  tax
adrninistration.
United Kingdom
The United Kingdom's  pension  system is complicated because employees can be
covered  by a number of different  forms of second-pillar pensions.  These include
employer-sponsored  defined-benefit  plans,  employer-sponsored  defined-
contribution  plans,  the  state-earnings  related  pension  (a  defined-benefit  public
scheme, known by its acronym, SERPS)  or personal pensions, which are individual
defined-contribution  accounts.
Employer plans that promise  a minimum standard  of benefits can 'contract
out' of the SERPS scheme. Both employers and employees then pay a lower rate of
social security  contribution.  (This is  called  the  contracted-out  rebate.)  The
employer is responsible for paying both employer and employee contributions into
the pension fund.
In  the  case  of  personal  pensions,  the  contributions  agency  collects
contributions  at the same rate as an individual covered by SERPS. The contracted-
out rebate  is then transferred  in the  month after the end  of the fiscal year  to the
individual's  chosen pension  fund.  There is an additional  payment  to  people  in
personal  pensions  to  reflect  the  loss  of  interest  on  the  contributions  as  the
government  holds them for an average of 61/2  months.
The tax authority, the Inland Revenue, has long collected most (95 per cent)
social  security  contributions  on  behalf  of the  contributions  agency.  The  two
24authorities  have  also worked  closely in  the  past  to  simplify  the  admninistrative
burden  on small businesses (see also the  discussion of Argentina's  efforts in this
area in Section  5.9, below). 16 The March  1998 budget  proposed  that  the  Inland
Revenue should  take  over  the  contributions  agency's  collection responsibilities
from April 1999 and that contributions policy issues should be transferred from the
Department  of  Social Security to  the  Treasury.  Social security  payments  will
continue to  be  run  by  a separate  benefits  agency.  Recent  legislation permitted
information sharing between the tax authority  and the benefits agency for the first
time and the legislation to merge the coHlection  authorities  includes provisions  to
allow the pooling  and cross-checking of different information sources. 17
5.5  Implementing  a centralised  system  in Argentina
Before the  Argentine  pension  reform,  workers  were  not  identified  by  a
special number,  although  there  was  a  database  containing  a  partial  history  of
individual  contributions.  The  government  created  a  unified  social  security
contribution (CUSS)  in 1992. This was collected by banks under the supervision  of
the  social security  agency  (ANSES).  The most important  element  of the  CUSS
reform  was  the  centralisation  of  health  insurance  contributions,  which  had
previously been  collected by a large  number  of non-governmental  organisations,
or obras  sociales,  owned by trade unions.
Contributions  could not be associated with  individuals  in this system.  So
the two main problems when the pension reform was introduced  were unifying all
contributions  and  distributing  revenues  among  the  different  agencies
administering  each  component  of  the  welfare  system.  The  first  was  easy  to
achieve, but the second was solved indirectly, using coefficients based on the obras
16  An evaluation  of the impact of closer co-operation on small businesses can be  found  in
Griffith and Thomas (1998).
17  See  Whitehouse  (1997a) for  a  discussion  of  controversies  over  information  sharing.
Department of Social Security (1998)  describes the legislation.
25sociales'  declarations  of previous  revenues.  This speeded  the  CUSS unification
process, which  took  only  a few months.  There was  no  special budget  for  this
programme.
The major reform  of the collection system occurred  in July 1994, when  the
new pension system  was introduced.  In just  nine months  (October 1993 to  July
1994),  workers were identified individually,  collecting agencies were merged,  and
a  new  information-technology  system  developed  (although  this  built  on  the
existing information network between ANSES and  the banks).  The information-
technology requirements  were contracted out to a 'transitory  union of enterprises'
(UTE) including  American  computer  giant  IBM  and  a  bank  cards  system
(BANELCO).  They  also  admninistered the  system  for  more  than  four  years.
Unfortunately,  there  is  no  public  information  on  the  costs  of  the  rapid
implementation of the new system.
5.6  Centralising collection in Georgia: a proposalfor  a gradual approach
The united  fund  of social protection  and  medical  insurance  in  Georgia
includes both  contributions  collection and  pension  benefit  administration  in  its
responsibilities.  The system, in common with many other pay-as-you-go regimes,
suffers from  widespread  evasion  of  contributions,  low  pension  levels  and  a
persistent deficit.
The government  sees centralising collection and  identifying  contributors  as
alternative ways of improving compliance. The central considerations are the need
for overall pension reform, the timing of centralisation and the choice of the united
fund  or  the tax  authority  to  collect contributions.  Some factors in  the  relative
efficiency of these two agencies are shown in Table 4.
26Table 4. Centralising collection in Georgia:
the social security or tax administration?
Issue  United  fund  Tax  authority
Role  of financial  Banks  receive  contributions  and  Banks  receive  taxes  and  transfer
intermediaries  transfer  them  to the  united  fund  them  to the  tax authority
Administrative  Manual  Predominantly  manual
procedures
Information  technology Very  limited,  mainly  for  statistics.  Incipient,  mainly  databases  of
No  administrative  database  institutional  information  of principal
('of  fiscal  interest')  contributors.
Identification  of  No  identification  of employees  System  being  developed  to identify
contributors  Identification  of employers  by  70,000  contributors  (enterprises).
manual  registers  No  identification  of workers
envisaged.
Control  Manual  and  non  systematic  Selective
Based  on  the  quarterly  declarations  Focus  on  enterprises  of 'fiscal
of payroll  payments  by  employers  interest'
Based  on  enterprises'  declarations
The tax inspectorate  has  a slight advantage  overall,  but  simply  transferring
social  security  contribution  collection  to  this  agency  is probably  not  a  sufficient
solution  to compliance  problems  in the short  term.
The creation of a new  agency  through  merger  might  be  a better  alternative,
but  obviously  envisages  potentially  costly  administrative  upheaval.  A  gradual
strategy,  as  outlined  in  Section  4.2,  might  be  better.  This  should  begin  with
identification  of  individual  employers,  then  of  individual  employees.  Thirdly,
quarterly  information  on employees  and  earnings  should  be collected,  followed  by
unification  of income  tax  and  social  security  payments.  Training  of staff  of the
united  fund  and  the  tax  authority  in  newly-designed  alternative  control
procedures  could  then  be  followed  the  organisational  unification  of  the  two
collecting  agencies.
5.7  Venezuela: a lesson on the importance of the collection agency
Collection, what  at first  might  appear  an uncontroversial,  operational  issue,
took  an  important  role  in  the  Venezuelan  debate  on  pension  reform.  The
27government  proposed  a centralised  social security  and  tax collection  system  as part
of  a  move  to  privately  managed  pension  accounts  and  other  social  security
reforms.  They  proposed  that  the  existing  tax  authority  should  be  the  single
collection  agency.  The  so-called  'unified  collector'  received  more  attention  in
Congress  and  in public  debate  than  any  other  reform  proposal.  The  government
took  a  strong  stand  on  this  proposal,  but  the  public's  negative  opinion  of  the
efficiency  and  transparency  of  the  tax  authority  cast  suspicion  on  the  whole
reform.  The  government  replaced  the  concept  of  the  unified  collector  with  a
system  centralising  only  the  information  technology  of  collection  without  the
transfer  of funds.  Unfortunately,  this  about  turn  was  too  late and  public  opinion
was firmly  set against  the whole  reform.
5.8  United  States
The debate  over  social security  reform  in the  United  States has  become  both
politicised  and  polarised,  with  operational  issues  so far  taking  a minor  role.  Many
reform  proposals,  including  that  of the National  Commission  on Retirement  Policy
(1998), recommnend that  a bureau  within  the  social  security  administration  would
be  responsible  for  record-keeping,  collection  and  transfer.  Others,  such  as  the
Conmuittee  for  Economic  Development  (1997),  are  wary  both  of  expanding  the
bureaucracy  and  the  difficulty  of insulating  contributions  'from  the  influence  of
budgetary  juggling'.18 The Heritage  Foundation  (Harris,  1998) has recommended  a
decentralised  model,  drawing  on  international  experience.  The  most  detailed
investigation  of  operational  issues  is  that  of  the  Employee  Benefits  Research
Institute  (Olsen and  Salisbury,  1998).  Although  they claim 'neither  to dissuade  the
advocates  nor  support  the  critics'  of individual  accounts,  they  argue  that  reform
would  be complex  for participants  to understand  and  difficult to admniister.
18  This is a rational fear.  When the budgetary impasse between the admninistration  and
Congress  led the latter to refuse to raise the federal debt limit, the government used federal
285.9  Encouraging compliance by small businesses in Argentina
The  Argentine  social security  system  has wide  legal  coverage,  but  there  are
serious  problems  in ensuring  all those  legally  obliged  to contribute  actually  do  so.
Evasion  is particularly  significant  among  the  self-employed,  especially  those  with
lower  incomes.
Non-compliance  may  partly  be  explained  by  high  fixed  compliance  costs,
including  registration,  payments,  inspections,  book-keeping,  professional  advice,
etc. To ease  this  administrative  burden,  a new  system  is being  developed  to  unify
the  social  security  contributions,  income  taxes and  VAT and  simplify  procedures.
To  contribute  through  this  system,  gross  annual  revenues  must  not  exceed
$144,000.  The  amount  of the  'single  contribution'  is determined  by a tariff,  which
has seven  categories  based  on annual  gross incomes  and  the number  of employees.
The single  contribution  is collected  by  the revenue  authority  (the AFIP) and  then
transferred  to  the  treasury,  the  social  security  administration  (ANSES) or  to  the
private  pension  funds  (AFJPs) as appropriate.
6.  Supervision
The choice  of collection  system  has  important  implications  for  supervision
and  regulation  of  the  pension  system.  This  depends  on  whether  the  pension
scheme  is a  multipillar  regime  involving  individual  accounts  or wholly  a  public,
defined-benefit  system,  whether  tax and  social security  collection  are unified,  and
whether  a centralised  or decentralised  model  is adopted.
If the  pension  scheme  remains  wholly  in  the  public  sector,  supervision  of
collection  is usually  the sole preserve  of the collection  agency.  However,  there  can
be cross-checks  in centralised  systems  between  different  social security  and  welfare
contributions  or between  contributions  and personal  income  taxes.
workers' funds from the Thrift  Savings  Plan (a defined-contribution  scheme)  to meet its liabilities
and avoid defaulting  on the national  debt.
29In multipillar  systems,  supervision  of collection  is more  complex,  consisting
of three  stages:  collection  of contributions  from  employers,  transfer  of  funds  to
pension  fund  mnanagers,  and  distribution  by  the  pension  fund  managers  into
individual  accounts.
6.1  Supervision  of centralised collection in multipillar  systems
The  supervision  of  centralised  collection  systems  run  by  a  public-sector
agency  is mainly  concerned  with  controlling  evasion  and  distributing  the  correct
funds  at  the  right  time  to  pension  funds  and  social  security  agencies.  Although
supervision  is still a major  task,  it is  greatly  simplified  by  the  centralised  pool  of
information  in the collecting  agency.
6.2  Supervision  of decentralised collection in multipillar  systems
Supervising  decentralised  collection  systems  is a more  complex,  fragmented
task.  Multiple  collecting  agencies  must  provide  regular  information  to  the
supervisory  agency.  On-site  inspections  will  be  needed  to  verify  that  all  three
stages  of the  collection  and  transfer  process  are carried  out  correctly  and  on  time.
Any  opportunities  to  cross-check  information  with  other  sources  should  also  be
pursued.
7.  Conclusions
Operational  issues  in  the  collection  and  transfer  of  pension  contributions
play  an important  part  in  the efficiency  and  equity  of pension  reform.  Although
the structure  of pension  systems  based  on individual  accounts  is often  predicated
on  a  desire  to  increase  compliance,  structural  reform  alone  is  unlikely  to  be
sufficient  in combating  evasion.
There  is  no  single  concept  of  a  'centralised'  collection  system.  In  a
multipillar  system,  it might  only  involve  collection  of pension  contributions  by  a
single agency,  or it might  include  the  collection  of all social  security  and  welfare
30contributions,  or  even  taxation.  The broader  the  definition  of  centralisation,  the
stronger  the arguments  for and  against.
We  have  argued  that  centralised  systems  can  achieve  economies  of  scale,
have  stronger  control  mechanisms  and  enforcement,  lower  costs  and  greater
transparency.  But  the benefits  of  centralisation  also  depend  on  the  strength  of
financial  intermediation,  the  availability  of  information  technology,  the
effectiveness  of  existing  collecting  agencies,  and  the  flexibility  of  public
organisations  in  embracing  change.  We  recommend  centralised  collection
wherever  institutional  and administrative  structures  allow.
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Collecting  social  security  contributions  is  an important  operational
issue  in all types  of pension  system.  Many regimes  are  plagued  by
poor  compliance  and  weak,  inefficient  administration.  Some  countries
have  tried  to introduce  an  automatic  incentive  to contribute  by moving
systems  closer  to 'actuarial  fairness',  where  pension  benefits  are  more
strictly related  to individual contributions.  Examples  include  the
systems  of individual  accounts  introduced  in a range  of countries  in
Latin  America and Eastern  Europe.  But in these  regimes,  collecting
and transferring  contributions  is  a more  complex  process.
This  paper  considers  different  aspects  of the process  of collecting
pension  contributions.  In Section  1, we describe  the most  serious
problems  affecting  collection systems  in several  countries.  Section
2 presents  the conceptual  relationships  bet\veen  alternative  pension-
system  models  and collection  systems.  Section  3 deals  with the
differences  between  centralised  and  decentralised  collection  systems
(  and  their  advantages  and  disadvantages.  Section  4 looks  at  operational
""  h  su  es.  Section  5 compares  experience  of collection  systems  in a
range  of  different  countries.  Section  6 looks  at  problems  of  regulation
atItti  n  dx  suprvin  vhi  e  thenfinal  section  concludes.  r
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